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MARQUETTE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXVI FEBRUARY, 1942 NUMBER TWO
PROBLEMS IN THE DRAFTING AND
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUSTS*
CHARLES M. Moist
T HE cardinal rule of fiduciary administration may fairly be
summed up in one word; viz.: Intent. All courts, definitely includ-
ing our own Supreme Court, have by repeated decisions stressed
the doctrine that the founder's lawful intent, expressed by will or
deed, constitutes the law of a given trust.'
This doctrine emphasizes the delicate responsibility of counsel pre-
paring a will or a deed of trust, to express in certain terms the lawful
purposes of the founder. Nor is counsel's duty discharged by a mere
faithful transcription of the founder's primary purpose. Counsel is
technically trained in weighing the lawfulness of intent, and is quali-
* The substance of this paper was presented before the Junior Association of
the Milwaukee Bar.
tMember of the Milwaukee bar; Vice-president, First Wisconsin Trust Com-
pany.
I In re Grotenrath's Estate, 215 Wis. 381, 254 N.W. 631 (1934) ; Will of Stanley,
223 Wis. 345, 269 N.W. 550 (1937); Freier v. Longnecker, 227 Ia. 366, 288
N.W. 444 (1939); In re Rooker's Will, 248 N.Y. 361, 162 N.E. 283 (1928);
Binney v. Attorney General, 259 Mass. 539, 156 N.E. 724 (1927).
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fled by his experience and his reading in the anticipation of conditions
and problems which his lay client is unlikely to foresee.
Many questions may be readily disposed of by the trust instrument,
but when not so disposed of involve regrettable perplexity and expense
of construction. This is illustrated by a will involving a large estate
which was before our Supreme Court so far back as 1885.2 The court
commented:
"It would be difficult to find a will with language unobscured and
containing so few provisions, and yet involving so many intricate legal
propositions. This does not result from any bungling or awkward use
of the words employed nor the usual confusion produced by a
superfluity of language, nor repeated inconsistent and conflicting
statements, but from a poverty of expression as to things touched
upon, obviously growing out of the absence of the requisite knowledge
of the law applicable to the dispositions intended." 3 The will again
came before the Supreme Court in 1928. 4 The trust which it created
consisted mainly of valuable business real estate, actually continued for
two lives for a period of nearly 60 years; and the court was constrained
to hold that there was no power of sale, and no power to lease beyond
the wholly conjectural term of the trust. A carefully drafted instru-
ment would not have caused such difficulty.
The founder of a trust, whether by will or by deed inter vivos, will
properly first consider the selection of his counsel to express and define
his purposes, and to guide him in the definition of those purposes.
He will next reflect, with his counsel's aid and guidance, upon the
selection of his trustee. No matter how skillfully his intent be defined,
an inexpert trustee can, and often will, defeat it in whole or in part.
Having sagaciously selected his counsel, and cautiously chosen his
trustee; how far shall he trust his trustee?
It has always seemed to the writer that unless highly implicit faith
can be reposed in the honesty and discretion of the chosen trustee, the
choice of a different trustee is imperative.
By the rules of the common law, and by statutes, the temptations
of fallible human nature are, tacitly or expressly, recognized as too
severe to be resisted. Trustees have come to be limited, consequently,
by some technical rules which, however essential in an earlier stage
of trust administration, are under present conditions often more bur-
densome than protective to the trust. It is not suggested that these
rules be abrogated or relaxed by law, but that the founder of a trust
study his fiduciary plan carefully with a view to making it broadly
2 Scott v, West, 63 Wis. 529 24 N.W. 161, 25 N.W. 18 (1885).
8 Ibid., 63 Wis. 529, 550, 24 '.W. 161, 163.
4 In re Caswell, 197 Wis. 327, 222 N.W. 235, 61 A.L.R. 1359 (1928).
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workable, as well as safe. This he can efficiently do only with the
aid, and guided by the study and experience, of counsel.
I The first problem confronting the founder of a trust involving real
estate is to make the terms of his trust so flexible, within the domain
of prudence, that the trust shall not be devastated by frozen and un-
productive assets. The trustee, having been cautiously selected, should
be definitely clothed with powers of conveyance, and with powers of
demise, which will enable him to deal with the res of the trust for
the benefit of the term tenant as well as of the remindermen.
A power of sale and conveyance, entrusted to a responsible and
competent trustee should always be incorporated. Assuming that such
a power may in some cases be abused, nevertheless an adequate remedy
for abuse of trust powers is readily invoked by the parties in interest.5
The interest of the trust estate peremptorily dictates that the title
conveyed by the trustee under his power should be unassailable: bene-
ficiaries are protected, since the trustee remains always responsible to
them for an abuse of that power.
As to leases of real estate subsisting in a trust, the rule presently
existing that (in the absence of specific power) they must be limited
to the term of the trusts,6 may and in perhaps a majority of cases will
result in an absolute incapacity of the trustee, even by the authority of
the court, to realize the present revenue and future value of the
property. Business property in metropolitan areas cannot be advan-
tageously rented for short and uncertain terms. Its practical use will
often involve large expenditures by the lessee. A valuable property,
capable of yielding a large revenue, will lie practically dormant, with
little or no revenue resulting, from the absolute inability of the trustee,
even with the aid of the court, to subject the property as a res to a
lease for a term of years.
Of course every trust will be governed by its own circumstances;
but those circumstances may be impracticable of prediction. It would
seem to be the part of prudence to clothe a responsible trustee with
the power to make any character of lease, usual and customary, bind-
ing the real estate and the successive interests therein, without reference
to the anticipated length or brevity of the trustee's actual estate.
Here again the trustee will always act at a certain peril and must
respond for any damages for a breach of trust, or an abuse of his
fiduciary discretion.7 The definition of such responsibility will be
considered later.
An important consideration in the foregoing suggestions is the im-
possibility, in our comparatively new community, of anticipating or
5 See A. L. I. Restatement Trusts, secs. 202, 205.6 See note 4, supra.
I See A. L. I. Restatement Trusts, sec. 305.
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predicting changes in the availability of given assets. Fifty years ago,
long leases were rare. They have since become common. In most trust
estates they constitute the only method by which unimproved, or im-
perfectly improved, real estate may be made adequately productive to
the term tenants and to the remaindermen. Consequently, the powers
of the trustee should be so adequately conferred that a court is required
to consider only whether those powers have been abused.
It may be, and in many estates that have come under the observa-
tion of the author certainly is, expedient to clothe the trustee with
power to make leases for a period of 99 years, and perhaps in some
cases to permit the trustee to grant options of purchase of the im-
proved property. The question of options of purchase will probably
arise in exceptional cases but should always be given thoughtful con-
sideration by counsel charged with the framing of wills, and deeds of
trust, and serious consultation with the contemplating founder of the
trust.
A question which should be given consideration in respect of unim-
proved, or imperfectly improved, real estate is whether the trustee
should be empowered to make improvements requisite to derive a
revenue; and if so, how the funds for such improvements shall be
raised. This problem will be influenced, and governed, by the condi-
tions existing in the specific contemplated trust. Without specific
authority in the will or deed of trust, a trustee cannot borrow money
for the purpose of improvements,8 and will be unable to invest other
assets of his trust estate in the requisite improvements. He is limited
in his investments by the trust investment statute which does not con-
template investments in real estate.9 A trustee may well be confronted
with the alternative of selling real estate at a sacrifice or of holding
it with little or no revenue, unless he is permitted, by use of a bor-
rowing power or of subsisting trust assets to make the estate produc-
tive, both for the term tenant and for the remaindermen.
The expression of the powers recommended will tax the learning,
experience and ingenuity of counsel. There are, however, powers
which may and in many cases are essential to the efficient, economical
and productive administration of the trust.
In connection with the powers vested in trustees a question has often
arisen, without entirely satisfactory answer, as to what extent powers
vest in surviving trustees or in successor trustees. In many cases wills
and trust agreements after designating the original trustees grant the
specific powers "to my said trustees." There is usually a provision for
the qualification of successor trustees. Whether there is or not, it is
8 Ibid., secs. 191, 188 comment e.
9 Wis. STAT. (1941) sec. 320.01.
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elementary that a trust will not fail for lack of a trustee.10 The court
will supply a trustee. Do these powers of "my said trustee" inure to
surviving trustees and to successor trustees? The author is not aware
of any satisfactory judicial answer to this question. It seems that the
powers are a part of the trust, and that they inure, with all the rest
of the trust, to surviving and successor trustees. The question should
not be left in doubt. Every will and deed of trust should define pre-
cisely how far the powers, however discretionary and confidential,
shall pass to surviving and successor trustees. Other-wise the surviving
or successor trustees may be crippled in his administration of the trust.
Of course one of the most difficult and persistent problems of a
trustee is the matter of investment of his trust fund. Chapter 320 of
the Wisconsin Statutes prescribes certain canons to which trustees
may conform in the absence of other authority in their wills and deeds
of trust. Conformity with this statute is not attended by infinite diffi-
culty. It must be recognized however that the statute is somewhat of
a counsel of perfection. Under conditions lately obtaining, investments
under this statute necessarily impose a low income yield. Under condi-
tions which many apprehend, investments under this statute may in-
volve an utterly negligible income yield; and it may become impera-
tive in the view of many founders of trusts broadly to extend the in-
vestment powers of their trustees. For many years past some founders
of trusts have extended these powers to the so-called insurance invest-
ment statutes of Wisconsin, under one of which investments may
even be made in stocks of solvent corporations. 1 It seems not unlikely
that founders of trusts who have confidence in their selected trustees
may continuously broaden the investment power, to the end that
trusts may participate in the hope of substantial revenues and profits
from equities at the same time that they are obliged to participate in
the possibilities of loss. Of course such powers impose grave and deli-
cate responsibilities upon the trustee. He must use the most implicit
good faith and he must use enlightened judgment. Any provisions thus
broadening the investment powers of trustees must, in order to be
effective, refer to the trustee's discretion.
Some text writers urge that trustees in making investments rely
upon the order of the court, and upon the advice of counsel. In Wis-
consin, at least, the writer believes that no court will be willing (except
as specifically authorized by statute) to enter an order varying the
peremptory calls of the investment statute. Whether such an order if
entered would be a protection to the trustee may be gravely questioned.
Nor does it seem that a trustee can evade his fiduciary duty by reliance
10 See PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (7th ed., 1929) sec. 38; Wis. STAT. (1941)
secs. 231.27, 231.28.
"Wis. STAT. (1941) sec. 20125.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
upon the advice of counsel. If an order of the court is ineffective to
relax the mandate of a statute, a fortiori is the advice of counsel
ineffective. It is to be apprehended that counsel, invited to pass upon
such question, would point to the statute and say, "There is your law."
Consequently, any broadening of investment powers should be clearly
and unequivocally expressed in the trust instrument.
A somewhat common form, of which the writer is doubtful, is one
to the effect that the trustee shall have the same powers which the
founder himself might have. Some courts have held that they cannot
construe this expression. The writer would prefer not to try to con-
strue it. It is not difficult to define broadly the investment powers of
the trustees (including their survivors and successors) in such words
that no doubt can arise, and that the founder's lawful intent 6an be
adopted by the trustee, and by the court.
A delicate question which not infrequently arises in trusts is the
application of Section 231.21 of the Wisconsin Statutes, providing that
the court may under certain circumstances direct the trustee to invade
the principal for the support of beneficiaries. The language of this
statute is such that its application to a given case is not easy. It may
be done only in the case of need. In one case our Supreme Court
declined to entertain the application because it considered that ade-
quate need was not disclosed. 12 It may be done only where the interests
of others are not invaded. In a recent case the Supreme Court held
that it was incompetent for the court to invade the principal of a
trust fund for the benefit of a term tenant who would never succeed
to the principal.'3 The only instance in which the writer was ever con-
vinced that the invasion was clearly warranted was one where two
term tenants divided the income; upon the death of either the trust
was to be closed and the fund distributed to the survivor, and the
two term tenants and remaindermen concurred in asking the invasion
for their common benefit. The Milwaukee county court approved the
invasion.
It is probably elementary, and was definitely recognized in
Will of Leitsch,' that where a residuary estate is limited to or in
trust for a beneficiary, the beneficiary is entitled to the income from
the date of the testator's death.
On the other hand, it has been established in Wisconsin that where
a legacy is left to a beneficiary the legacy draws interest or income
only from one year after the date of death; and in Will of Barrett,15
it was held that where a money legacy was left in trust for a bene-
12 In re Estate of Adams, 216 Wis. 77, 255 N.W. 886 (1934).
'1 In re Estate of Boyle, 232 Wis. 631, 288 N.W. 257 (1939).
14 185 Wis. 257, 201 N.W. 284 (1924).
125 173 Wis. 313, 181 N.W. 220 (1921).
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ficiary the legacy, drew interest or income only from one year after
the testator's death.
This distinction is not recognized by the courts of many states,
and is denied or ignored by responsible text writers. The American
Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Trusts holds that a money
legacy left in trust for a beneficiary draws its income to the beneficiary
from the date of testator's death.'16 Unless the Leitsch case overrules
the Barrett case (which the author does not read into it) the execu-
tor's income from a money legacy, whether disposed directly to a
beneficiary or in trust for a beneficiary, inures to the residuary estate.
Another interesting angle of this problem is: if a residuary estate
is disposed to or in trust for a beneficiary, what is the disposition of
the executor's income from assets which never lapse into the residuary
estate but are used, after a year, in paying debts, legacies, taxes and
cost of administration? This income, in an invested estate, may well
be considerable. So far as my reading goes, the question has not been
considered by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and has been dealt
with radically differently in different jurisdictions.17 There is for
example, a strong Massachusetts case which holds that such income
belongs to the term beneficiary, or to the trustee for his benefit.'
A trust problem which has occasioned a wealth of irreconcilable
decisions" is the allocation, between term tenant and remainderman-
that is, between income and corpus-of dividends on corporate stocks.
This problem has often been treated by our own Supreme Court,20
and by a recent decision is dealt with under perplexing conditions.21
A trust estate was largely committed to an industrial stock of a
substantial surplus value accumulated before the testator's death. A
dividend policy maintained for many years was continued after the
foundation of the trust, with formal notice to the trustees that it was
derived, in whole or in part, from surplus antedating the testator's
death. The Supreme Court emphasized the view that the dividend was
ordinary, and should be credited to the income account, without attempt
to discover the source of the dividends; and that "ordinary dividends"
are frequently not large enough to warrant a burdensome investigation
by the trustee into their source. As to the inevitable result of depleting
the corpus value of the estate, the court decided: "The trustees are
16 A. L. I. Restatement Trusts, sec 234. Note illustration 2. Cf., however, com-
ment d and e.
17 See, for example, Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N.Y. 561, 109 N.E. 611 (1915);
McDonough v. Montague, 259 Mass. 612, 157 N.E. 159 (1927).
Is Old Colony Trust Company v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500, 165 N.E. 657 (1929);
see, however, A. L. I. Restatement Trusts, sec 234, comment g.
'19 See monographic note, 130 A. L. R. 492 (1941).
20 In re Estate of Dittmer, 197 Wis. 304, 222 N.W. 323 (1928); In re Will of
Jenkins, 199 Wis. 131, 225 N.W. 733 (1929); In re Estate of -Boyle, 232 Wis.
631, 288 N.W. 257 (1939).
21 In re Estate of Boyle, 235 Wis. 591, 294 N.W. 29, 130 A. L. R. 486 (1940).
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required to make proper allocation of dividends to corpus or income,
and if this is done appear to us to have no further responsibility with
respect to book value.
2 2
A note to this case23 discloses the wide difference of opinion in the
courts, and suggests many elements which still are not clearly covered
by Wisconsin decisions. For example, a continuous, recurrent divi-
dend, normal in amount, even if wholly or partly out of capital sur-
plus, would seem to be an ordinary dividend. But if dividends are
suspended for several years, and are then resumed in normal amounts
out of capital surplus, may the trustee treat them as ordinary dividends
and allocate them to income? And, if there comes to the trustee a
block of stock appraised at ten times its par value, may the trustee
treat a usual recurrent dividend of 6% on appraisal, but 60% on the
nominal par,.and paid wholly or largely out of capital surplus, as in-
come? These, and similar problems, are frequently recurrent in trust
administration. They may involve trusts in costly litigation. They may
involve trustees in burdensome liabilities. They will inevitably trouble
and may often perplex the courts. The draughtsmen of wills and trust
agreements can deal with them effectively only if they have full knowl-
edge of the trust portfolio, and of the surplus value of the stocks in
the portfolio, and of the trust founder's purposes as to dividends. If
the surplus value is to be paid out in dividends, and those dividends
to be distributed as income, the remainderman's estate may be and in
some cases will be heavily depleted. The trust founder should under-
stand his problem, and should instruct his trustee dn clear and
unequivocal terms.
It has been suggested in this article that a trustee having been
cautiously selected with a view to his probity, his competency and his
responsibility, broad discretion should be reposed in him. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court has justly held that the discretion of a trustee is
more than a matter of ordinary care. 24 Nevertheless, in order that the
founder of a trust may reasonably expect his trustee to proceed con-
fidently though cautiously in the administration of the trust, to the
end that those intended as the recipients of his bounty shall most ade-
quately benefit, he must give the trustee such reasonable protection as
will give his discretion some effect. The trustee should not be tempted
to evade all his responsibilities and opportunities of service in order
merely to escape responsibility for errors made in good faith and in
the exercise of due care. The trustee's discretion should be deliberately
defined as the reasonable care which prudent men would exercise
under like circumstances in their own affairs, or a like definition.''
22 Ibid., 235 Wis. 591, 599, 294 N.W. -29, 32.
23 130 A. L. R. 492 (1941).
24In re Estate of Allis, 191 Wis. 23, 209 N.W. 945 (1926) ; Whitford- v. Redde-
man, 196 Wis. 10, 219 N.W. 361 (1928); In re Will of Church, 221 Wis. 472,
266 N.W. 210 (1936).
